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1 Introduction
The rise in unemployment observed in many European countries over the past decades has been
particularly strong among low-skilled workers. One possible interpretation for these uneven
changes in unemployment variations is biased technological progress. If investment in new
technologies raises the relative demand for skilled workers1, low-skilled unemployment increases
unless the variation in relative demands is compensated by a change in relative wages or in
relative labor supplies. Biased technological change combined with relative wage rigidities may
thus lead to “skill mismatch” and thereby, to higher low-skilled unemployment rates (see table
1). However, more and more attention has recently been paid to an alternative explanation
in terms of job competition. If high-skilled workers compete with low-skilled ones for low-
skilled jobs, but the opposite is not true, purely aggregate shocks can have strong asymmetric
unemployment effects by generating the so-called ladder effect. The interest for this alternative
view has arisen from the observation that all unemployment rates have increased, while a biased
technological change should a priori decrease unemployment of high-skilled workers, at least if
wage-wage interactions are not too strong. In many OECD countries, investment in human
capital (education) has significantly increased despite a stable wage premium (see for instance
Muysken and ter Weel (1999)). Youngsters invest more in human capital not because the relative
wage of high-skilled on complex jobs has increased, but rather because a higher education level
increases the number of job opportunities2.
Several authors examine this issue. Gautier (2002) develops a stylized partial equilibrium model
with two types of jobs and two types of workers and wage bargaining. He focuses on the station-
ary state properties of the model and emphasizes the diversity of effects that can be obtained
1There is wide evidence suggesting that technological progress may have substantially increased the relative
demand for skilled workers (see for instance Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Berman, Bound, and Griliches
(1994), or Machin and Van Reenen (1998)).
2Recent empirical work suggest that the proportion of “overqualified” workers is far from negligible although
hard to evaluate. Hartog (2000) collects empirical results from various studies about the level of job competition
(“overeducation”) in several EU countries. Depending on the methodology used and the country surveyed, this
overeducation is estimated to be between 10% and 30% during the first half of the nineties. Moreover, they also
show that overeducation increased over the last decades (except in UK). Forgeot and Gautie´ (1997) report that,
in France, the proportion of overeducated workers has strongly increased between 1986 and 1995, particularly
among women and young workers looking for a first job. Following their study, between 1986 and 1995 the
proportion of French workers with an university diploma being overqualified in their job increased from 6.6% to
18.7%. Moreover, in 1995, more than 24% of young women were overqualified.
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LOW-SKILLED UNEMPLOYMENT RATES RELATIVE WAGES
(difference wrt. average unemployment rate)
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1995
Belgium 0.7 2.7 6.2 D1/D5 .. 71.6 71.8
France 1.6 8.5 11.3 D1/D5 61.1 61.9 62.0
Germany 2.7 7.2 7.8 D1/D5 68.0 70.7 72.9
United Kingdom 1.4 7.4 6.5 D1/D5 63.1 59.6 57.4
United States 2.5 3.4 5.1 D1/D5 51.5 48.7 48.5
D1/D5: ratio of the upper earnings limit of the first decile of workers to the upper limit of the fifth decile.
Source concerning unemployment rates: Sneessens and Shadman (2000) for Belgium; Fonseca, Maillard, and Sneessens
(1998) for France; Buttler and Tessaring (1993) for Germany; Nickell and Quintini (2001) for the United Kingdom (only
male workers); Bureau of Labor Statistics database for the United States.
Source concerning relative wages: OECD Employment Outlook 1996 chapter 3. For Belgium we have information only
between 1985-1993 and for Germany between 1983-1993.
Table 1: Low-skilled unemployment rates (difference with respect to average unemployment
rates) and relative wages in five OECD countries (in percent).
as a result of the externalities introduced via the matching function. Dolado, Felgueroso, and
Jimeno (2000) use a similar approach with a simpler albeit more realistic representation of wage
determination to provide a quantitative analysis of the Spanish case. They calibrate a stationary
equilibrium model to evaluate the job competition effect triggered by the dramatic increase in
the proportion of skilled workers that took place in the late eighties. Similar models are also
considered in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2002). Collard,
Fonseca, and Mun˜oz (2002) provide a first attempt to include this type of quantitative analysis
in a dynamic general equilibrium setup. Pierrard and Sneessens (2002) use a similar setup with
on-the-job search and endogenous search intensities for high-skilled workers. Their model is able
to explain a significant part of the unemployment rise observed in Belgium over the last twenty
years by simply changing two parameters: the relative productivity of high-skilled workers and
the proportion of high-skilled workers in the total labor force.
One of the main difficulties in these models is to account simultaneously for the three main styl-
ized facts observed in many EU countries since the mid-seventies: (i) the increase in the overall
unemployment rate; (ii) the difference between high-skilled and low-skilled unemployment; (iii)
the stability of relative wages. This paper focuses on these issues. It builds on Pierrard and
Sneessens (2002). Compared to their model, our methodological contribution is threefold. In-
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stead of assuming that low-skilled wages are indexed on high-skilled ones, we allow separate wage
bargaining for all workers. Second, by endogenizing search intensities of low-skilled workers we
are able to capture a kind of discouragement effect understood as a decrease in the intensity of
search rather than as duration concept (there is no duration in our model). Moreover, because
high-skilled workers choose endogenously the effort devoted to each labor market segment we are
able to measure the evolution of the job competition effect. Finally, we introduce a biased tech-
nological progress resulting from the combination of embodied technical change with capital-skill
complementarity. Authors like Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krussel (1997) or Mairesse, Cette,
and Kocoglu (2000) find that technological progress has become increasingly incorporated in new
capital goods. We thus distinguish between embodied and disembodied technological change and
endogenize the first of them. The importance of the capital-skill complementary relationship
has also been signaled by many empirical studies (see Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994),
Machin and Van Reenen (1998) or Krusell et al. (2000)).
When calibrated on the Belgian economy, the model reproduces the three stylized facts men-
tioned above. We obtain a significant discouragement effect (decrease in search intensity) for
low-skilled workers induced by the reduction in their employment opportunities due to the lower
demand for simple jobs and the increased job competition. The reduced demand is explained by
the skill-biased technological progress which favors the relative productivity of complex jobs and
thus the opening of complex vacancies. The increased job competition results from the fall in
the labor market tension of the complex segment (the number of job seekers in this segment in-
creases relatively more than the number of vacancies) which leads high-skilled workers to devote
more search effort to the simple segment.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model. We describe labor market
flows, workers and firms behaviors, and wage bargaining. In section 3 we calibrate the model on
Belgian data for 1996. We examine the properties of the model by simulating its responses to
various types of shocks. We next set the technological and labor force composition variables to
their 1976 values and check the ability of the model to reproduce the stylized facts. Moreover,
we also quantify the contribution of the low-skilled’s discouragement effect, job competition and
wage bargaining to the predicting performance of the model. Finally, we analyze the effects of
various policy measures. Section 4 concludes.
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2 The model
The structure of the model is based on an earlier work by Pierrard and Sneessens (2002).
The economy consists of two broad categories of agents, firms and households. We distinguish
two types of households; each type is defined by the skill level (high or low) of its members.
All members of a household supply inelastically one unit of labor; they may be employed or
unemployed3.
We distinguish three types of firms: two types of intermediate good firms, producing respectively
high- and low-tech intermediate goods with labor as sole input, and one representative final firm,
combining capital and the two intermediate goods to produce an homogeneous final good. The
final good can be used for consumption or capital accumulation. The production of high-tech
intermediate goods involves complex tasks that can only be carried out by high-skilled workers.
The production of low-tech intermediate goods consists of simpler tasks that can be carried out
by both high- or low-skilled workers. There is thus a double heterogeneity as in Gautier (2002):
heterogeneity of jobs (complex vs simple) and heterogeneity of workers (high- vs low-skilled).
There are three types of markets: labor, goods and capital. On the labor side, we distinguish
between the complex and the simple job markets, where the complex jobs can only be occupied by
high-skilled workers and simple jobs by both high- and low-skilled workers. For each type of job,
we assume an exogenous job destruction rate and represent the matching process by a standard
matching function (Cobb-Douglas). Because they know that their application will always be
turned down, low-skilled job seekers never apply for complex jobs. High-skilled unemployed
workers may look for both types of jobs. The effort devoted to search in each segment depends
on the employment possibilities and wages. Furthermore, the set of parameter values adopted
guarantees the absence of corner solutions in the benchmark simulation, i.e. there is always a
number of high-skilled workers in simple jobs. High-skilled workers hired on a simple job may
continue searching for a complex job (on-the-job search). Low-skilled unemployed workers may
search more or less intensively for a simple job, depending on its attractiveness compared to
home production. All good markets (the two intermediate goods and the final good markets) are
assumed to be perfectly competitive. The price of the final good is normalized to one. On the
3The representative household formulation amounts to assuming that workers of a given group are perfectly
insured against their own individual unemployment risk. This simplification is common in the literature and is
needed to keep the model tractable.
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capital market, the supply is determined by the stock of capital previously accumulated by the
household (as explained in section 2.5 all capital stock is owned by the high-skilled household).
The interest rate adjusts to make the quantity demanded by the representative final firm equal
to this predetermined capital stock.
Labor market flows are detailed in the following subsection. Next we successively discuss the
behaviors of the intermediate and final firms, the mechanisms of biased technological change and
capital accumulation, the behaviors of high- and low-skilled households and, finally, the wage
determination processes.
2.1 Labor market flows
Let N ct and N
s
t represent total employment in complex and simple jobs, respectively. Simple
jobs can be occupied by high- (N sht ) or low-skilled (N
sl
t ) workers, so that N
s
t = N
sh
t + N
sl
t .
Normalizing the total labor force to one and denoting by α the exogenous4 proportion of high-
skilled workers in the total labor force yields the following accounting identities:
N ct +N
sh
t + U
h
t = α, and N
sl
t + U
l
t = 1− α, (1)
where Uht and U
l
t denote the number of high- and low-skilled unemployed job-seekers respectively.
Evidently, considering only two broad categories of workers (high- and low-skilled) and two types
of jobs, implies neglecting an important part of the observed ladder effect (overqualified workers
in a job) since as remarked by Cockx and Dejemeppe (2004), the competition is more intense
inside these large groups. However, on the aim of simplicity we prefer to keep this minimalist
representation of the labor market where job competition is measured as the proportion of simple
jobs occupied by high-skilled workers (or equivalently the proportion of potentially employed
low-skilled workers that are crowded-out by high-skilled).
Let the number of complex and simple job matches be denoted by M ct and M
s
t respectively.
We assume that the number of such matches is a function of the number of corresponding job
vacancies (V ct and V
s
t ) and effective job seekers (the number of job seekers weighted by their
search efficiencies), that is, we use the following two matching functions:
M ct = M
c
(
V ct , sct U
h
t + sot N
sh
t
)
and M st = M
s
(
V st , sht U
h
t + slt U
l
t
)
, (2)
4An endogenous α would require the model to consider human capital formation and education issues, which
is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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where sct, sot, sht and slt stand for the search efficiency of each type of job seeker. Both
functions are assumed to be linear homogeneous (Cobb-Douglas). We assume that every period,
both the high- and the low-skilled unemployed workers spend a certain amount of time having
what we call an active life. In other words, every period, a constant fraction of time is spent
on searching for a job or doing other productive activities (in our case, domestic production),
while the rest of the time is devoted to non-productive activities (such as sleeping, eating, etc.).
The amount of time spent in active life is the same for high- and low-skilled workers, and we
normalize it to one.
We assume that a high-skilled unemployed worker devotes all her active time searching for a
job, however, given the conditions prevailing on the labor market (wages, probabilities to find
jobs,...), she allocates this time between searching for a complex job (0 ≤ eht ≤ 1) and for a
simple job (0 ≤ 1 − eht ≤ 1). Remark that in the high-skilled worker’s case, the total amount
of time devoted to search is exogenous, since we assume that she spends all her active time
searching for a job. However, the worker chooses endogenously the search effort devoted to
each labor market segment (because a high-skilled worker can apply to simple and complex
jobs, we make the hypothesis that she never gets discouraged from search, and simply allocates
more or less effort to each labor market segment depending on the employment possibilities of
the segment). High-skilled on simple jobs spend a fraction (0 ≤ eot ≤ 1) of their leisure time
(normalized to 1) searching for a complex job. Besides, a low-skilled unemployed splits her active
time between searching for a job in the simple segment (0 ≤ elt ≤ 1) and staying at home doing
domestic activities (0 ≤ 1 − elt ≤ 1). Because they know that their application will always be
turned down, low-skilled job seekers never apply for complex jobs, so when they are not looking
for a job in the simple segment, they simply stay at home doing domestic activities. When
employment opportunities in the simple segment fall the worker gets discouraged and spends
more time doing domestic activities. This contrasts with the assumption made for high-skilled
workers, who do not suffer the discouragement effect. Search efficiencies, sot, sct, sht and slt
are concave and increasing functions of the search efforts, eot, eht, 1− eht and elt, respectively.
We define labor market tensions as the ratio between the number of vacancies and the number
of effective job seekers and denote them by ϑct and ϑ
s
t respectively, where:
ϑct ≡
V ct
sct Uht + sot N
sh
t
and ϑst ≡
V st
sht Uht + slt U
l
t
. (3)
With linear homogeneous matching functions, the probabilities pct and p
s
t of finding a complex
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and a simple job per unit of search intensity can be respectively written as follows:
pct =
M ct
sct Uht + sot N
sh
t
= pc (ϑct) and p
s
t =
M st
sht Uht + slt U
l
t
= ps (ϑst ) . (4)
The probabilities qct and q
s
t of filling a complex and a simple job vacancy are similarly given by:
qct =
M ct
V ct
= qc
(
1
ϑct
)
and qst =
M st
V st
= qs
(
1
ϑst
)
. (5)
The probability that a simple job is filled is the sum of the probabilities of hiring a high-skilled
worker and a low-skilled worker:
qsht =
sht U
h
t
sht Uht + slt U
l
t
qst and q
sl
t =
slt U
l
t
sht Uht + slt U
l
t
qst . (6)
Nsl Nc
Ul Uh
sc.pcsl.ps
sh.ps
so.pc
χ s
χcχ s
« on-the-job-search »Nsh
Figure 1: Labor market flows and transition probabilities.
Finally, we assume two exogenous job destruction rates, χc (for the complex jobs) and χs (for the
simple jobs), which implies for each type of job and worker the following employment dynamics
(in terms of vacancies and job-seekers’ search effort respectively):
N ct+1 = (1− χc) N ct + qct V ct , (7-a)
= (1− χc) N ct + pct
[
sct U
h
t + sotN
sh
t
]
. (7-b)
N sht+1 = (1− χs − sot pct) N sht + qsht V st , (8-a)
= (1− χs − sot pct) N sht + pst shtUht . (8-b)
N slt+1 = (1− χs) N slt + qslt V st , (9-a)
= (1− χs) N slt + pst sltU lt . (9-b)
Figure 1 summarizes these labor market flows and transition probabilities. Armed with these
definitions and notations, we can now describe the behaviors of the firms and households.
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2.2 Intermediate firms
We use the standard one-job-one-firm representation. Each intermediate firm can open either a
complex or a simple vacancy. Let us denote the asset value of a vacant (resp. filled) complex
job by W VNc
t
(resp. WFNc
t
). The cost of opening a complex vacancy equals vct per period. A filled
complex job produces each period one unit of complex intermediate good sold at a price cct ; the
wage paid to the worker is denoted wct . The asset values of the vacant and filled complex jobs
are then given by:
W VNc
t
= −vct + Et
[
β˜t+1
(
qct W
F
Nc
t+1
+ (1− qct ) W VNc
t+1
)]
, (10)
WFNc
t
= cct − wct + Et
[
β˜t+1
(
(1− χc) WFNc
t+1
+ χc W VNc
t+1
)]
, (11)
where β˜t+1 is the firm’s discount factor (defined in section 2.5).
Simple job vacancies can be filled with either a high-skilled or a low-skilled worker. The two
workers may however have different productivity. Let W VNs
t
denote the asset value of a vacant
simple job. The asset value of a filled simple job will be denoted W F
Nsh
t
when filled by a high-
skilled worker and WF
Nsl
t
when filled by a low-skilled worker. Let vst denote the vacancy cost
per period, cst the selling price, w
sh
t and w
sl
t the wage paid to the high- and low-skilled worker
respectively. Asset values are then given by:
W VNs
t
= −vst + Et
[
β˜t+1
(
qsht W
F
Nsh
t+1
+ qslt W
F
Nsl
t+1
+ (1− qsht − qslt ) W VNs
t+1
)]
, (12)
WF
Nsh
t
= cst − wsht + Et
[
β˜t+1
(
(1− χs − pct sot) WFNsh
t+1
+ (χs + pct sot) W
V
Ns
t+1
)]
, (13)
WF
Nsl
t
= ν . cst − wslt + Et
[
β˜t+1
(
(1− χs) WF
Nsl
t+1
+ χs W VNs
t+1
)]
, (14)
where the parameter ν allows different productivity levels for high- and low-skilled workers (ν
may a priori be larger or smaller than unity). We finally assume the usual free entry conditions
(the firms open vacancies until no benefit can be obtained from an additional vacancy):
W VNc
t
= W VNs
t
= 0. (15)
2.3 Final firm
The representative final firm uses capital (Kt), complex and simple intermediate goods (Q
c
t and
Qst respectively) in order to produce a final good via a linear homogeneous production function
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F
(
Kt, Q
c
t , Q
s
t
)
. The firm’s optimization problem can be represented by:
max
Kt, Q
c
t
, Qs
t
F
(
Kt, Q
c
t , Q
s
t
)− cKt Kt − cct Qct − cst Qst , (16)
where cKt is the usage cost of capital, while c
c
t and c
s
t stand, respectively, for the price of complex
and simple intermediate goods. The first order optimality conditions are given by the standard
marginal productivity conditions:
FKt = c
K
t , FQct = c
c
t , FQst = c
s
t , (17)
where FXt stands for the first derivative of F with respect to Xt. In the rest of the paper, we
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale:
F (Kt, Q
c
t , Q
s
t ) = z
[
Kt
]1−µ [(
Qct
)θc
t
(
Qst
)θs
t
]µ
, θct + θ
s
t = 1 , (18)
where z represents total factor productivity and 1− µ is the capital share. As discussed below,
we allow the productivity coefficients, θct and θ
s
t , of the two intermediate inputs to vary over
time. Notice that the equilibrium conditions in the intermediate goods markets imply:
Qct = N
c
t and Q
s
t = N
sh
t + νN
sl
t , (19)
so that changes in the values of θct and θ
s
t induce changes in the marginal productivity (in value
added terms) of complex and simple jobs respectively.
2.4 Skill-Bias
The empirical evidence reveals that the use of new technologies is associated to an increased
relative demand for skilled labor, as a result of either technological requirements (see Berman,
Bound, and Griliches (1994) for an example on the U.S. economy and Machin and Van Reenen
(1998) for European countries) or induced organizational changes (see for instance Caroli and
Van Reenen (2001) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002)). This suggests that the
variation in the demand for skilled labor should best be seen as resulting from a combina-
tion of embodied technological progress and capital-skill complementarity. The empirical rele-
vance of these two aspects has been emphasized by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krussel (1997)
or Mairesse, Cette, and Kocoglu (2000) for embodied technological progress and by Berman,
Bound, and Griliches (1994), Krusell et al. (2000), Lindquist (2004) or Machin and Van Reenen
(1998), among others, for capital-skill complementarity. In line with this empirical literature,
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we consider that the change in the relative demand for high-skilled workers is associated to
embodied technological progress.
We model the embodiment process by allowing new investment goods to be more productive
than older ones, which is simple to formalize and, at the same time, seems quite intuitive.
Following Boucekkine, del Rio, and Licandro (2003), we write the law of motion of capital5 as:
Kt+1 −Kt = et It − δ Kt , 0 < δ < 1 , (20)
where It denotes investment expenditures and δ is the exogenous depreciation rate of capital.
The variable et is an index measuring the marginal contribution of investment expenditures to
the aggregate capital stock (it stands for the embodied technological progress). The term 1/et
is interpreted as the relative price of new capital goods.
We represent embodied technical progress by a simple learning-by-doing (LBD) process, where
the productivity of the capital good sector, measured by et, is a positive function of the size of
that sector, measured by Kt:
et = e0 K
γ
t , γ ≥ 0 , (21)
where e0 is the scale parameter and γ measures the efficiency of the LBD process. Equations
(20) and (21) describe this process: for each unit of final good invested in period t, we obtain
et > et−1 units of capital. These productivity gains lead to lower capital good prices, which
stimulates investment, increases the total capital stock, and leads to further productivity gains
(via the learning process described in equation (21)). This process comes to an end when
these productivity gains (∆et) are more than compensated by the decrease in the marginal
productivity of capital (∆FKt).
The complementary relationship between capital and skills is introduced by allowing the use of
new technologies to change the relative productivity (in value added terms) of skilled labor:
θct
θst
= a0 e
a1
t , a1 ≥ 0 . (22)
An upturn in et improves the productivity of new investment goods and complex intermediate
goods (which stimulates the relative demand for high-skilled labor). This specification endoge-
nizes the observed complementarity between new technologies and skilled labor and keeps the
5Boucekkine, del Rio, and Licandro (2003) show that this simple representation can be obtained from an
explicit vintage model.
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Cobb-Douglas production function framework supported by the aggregate evidence and used in
most dynamic macro models6.
2.5 Households
The household decisions bear on consumption and savings and on job search efforts. To avoid
untractable ex post heterogeneity issues, most general equilibrium models with search assume
that workers are perfectly insured against individual unemployment risks. Assuming a large
representative household is a simple way of introducing such an assumption. For our purpose,
it is important though to distinguish at least two types of households, a high- and a low-skilled
household. Employment probabilities and expected wage incomes are quite different for high-
and low-skilled workers. This will affect their search behaviors, as well as the negotiated wages.
To simplify we assume that the whole capital stock is owned by the high-skilled (high-income)
household. This amounts to assuming that the low-skilled (low-income) household consumes its
current income in every period.
The representative high-skilled household
The members of the high-skilled household can be either unemployed, employed on a complex
job getting paid a wage wct , or employed on a simple job getting paid a wage w
sh
t . The decision
variables of the household are the consumption level of each of its members and the amount of
time devoted to search in each segment for those who are unemployed or employed on a low-paid
simple job. We assume that unemployed job seekers devote all their free time (normalized to
unity) to search; they choose the fraction of this time, eht, that will be devoted to the complex
market. Similarly, workers on a simple job devote a fraction, eot, of their leisure time to on-
the-job search. The optimization problem of the representative high-skilled household can be
written as the following Bellman equation:
WHt = max
Ch
t
, eht, eot
{
α U
(
Cht
α
)
−N sht D (eot) + β Et
[
WHt+1
]}
, (23)
6Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) estimate a production function with two types of labor for several OECD
countries and conclude that the Cobb-Douglas hypothesis cannot be rejected; biased technical progress takes the
form of an exogenous change in the productivity coefficients. The Cobb-Douglas specification is also motivated
in the RBC literature by the observation that the capital share remains stable in the long run.
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subject to constraints (1), (7-b), (8-b) and to the flow budget constraint :
wctN
c
t + w
sh
t N
sh
t + w
u
t U
h
t + c
k
t Kt + Πt =
1
et
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)
+ Cht + Tt. (24)
WHt is a function of the initial values of the three state variables Kt, N ct , N sht ; U(.) is an increas-
ing and concave function of per capita consumption (Cht measures thus the total consumption of
the high-skilled household); D(.) is an increasing and convex function of the amount of leisure
time devoted to on-the-job search; β is a psychological discount factor. The resources of the
high-skilled household include wage incomes, an unemployment benefit wut , the rents from cap-
ital plus the profits Πt redistributed by the intermediate good firms. Investment expenditures
are equal to net capital accumulation times the relative price of new capital goods 1/et (see
(20)). Tt represents a lump-sum tax levied on the high-skilled household to finance government
expenditures.
Let us define rt as the net interest rate measured in units of capital
7. More precisely:
rt = c
k
t . et − δ . (25)
Let us also define the asset values (from the high-skilled household’s point of view) of an addi-
tional complex or simple job as:
WHNc
t
=
1
UCh
t
∂WHt
∂N ct
and WH
Nsh
t
=
1
UCh
t
∂WHt
∂N sht
, (26)
respectively. The first-order optimality conditions can then be written as follows:
UCh
t
= β Et
[(
1 + rt+1
) et
et+1
UCh
t+1
]
, (27)
0 = Et
[
pct sceht β˜t+1 W
H
Nc
t+1
− pst sh1−eht β˜t+1 WHNsh
t+1
]
, (28)
Deot
UCh
t
= pct soeot Et
[
β˜t+1
(
WHNc
t+1
−WH
Nsh
t+1
)]
, (29)
7The optimal capital stock is defined by the usual optimality condition:
FKt = c
K
t
where FKt stands for the marginal productivity of capital and c
K
t for the capital usage cost. We should keep in
mind, however, that the marginal productivity of capital, FKt , is defined in terms of final goods, while the rate
of return to investors is defined in terms of capital goods. The relative price of the latter is 1/et. Hence, the
marginal cost of capital, cKt , is related to the rate of return by:
cKt =
1
et
(rt + δ) .
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where the discount factor β˜t+1 is defined by:
β˜t+1 = β
UCh
t+1
UCh
t
. (30)
From the envelope theorem, we can obtain the following additional dynamic relationships:
WHNc
t
=
(
wct − wut
)
+
(
1− χc − pct sct
)
Et
[
β˜t+1 W
H
Nc
t+1
]
− pst sht Et
[
β˜t+1 W
H
Nsh
t+1
]
, (31)
WH
Nsh
t
=
(
wsht − wut
)−D (eot) /UCh
t
+ pct (sot − sct) Et
[
β˜t+1 W
H
Nc
t+1
]
+
(
1− χs − sot pct − pst sht
)
Et
[
β˜t+1 W
H
Nsh
t+1
]
. (32)
The representative low-skilled household
While high-skilled unemployed workers can search for a job on both the complex and the simple
segments, low-skilled unemployed workers have only the choice between searching for a simple job
or doing some “domestic production”. By assumption, the low-skilled household accumulates no
capital. Its sole decision variable is the fraction of time elt that the unemployed worker devotes
to job search rather than to domestic activities. Its optimization problem can thus be written
as the following Bellman equation:
WLt = max
elt
{
(1− α) U
(
C lt
1− α
)
+ β Et
[
WLt+1
]}
, (33)
subject to (9-b) and the flow budget constraint:
C lt = w
sl
t N
sl
t + U
l
t
[
wut + (1− elt) ydt
]
. (34)
WLt is a function of the initial value of the state variable N slt , C lt is the total amount consumed
by the low-skilled household and ydt is the productivity of unemployed workers on domestic ac-
tivities.
The first order optimality condition can be written as follows:
ydt = p
s
t slelt Et
[
βˆt+1 W
L
Nsl
t+1
]
, (35)
where βˆt+1 = β UCl
t+1
/UCl
t
is the discount factor of the low-skilled household and W L
Nsl
t
=
1
U
Cl
t
∂WL
t
∂Nsl
t
the asset value of an additional simple job at time t. From the envelope theorem we
obtain:
WL
Nsl
t
=
(
wslt − wut − (1− elt) ydt
)
+
(
1− χs − pst slt
)
Et
[
βˆt+1 W
L
Nsl
t+1
]
. (36)
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2.6 Wage determination
There are three types of matches (high-skilled worker on a complex or a simple job; low-skilled
worker on a simple job). We assume that the wage rate is in each case determined at the
beginning of every period by a Nash bargaining process, which yields the following sharing
rules:
WHNc
t
= ηc
(
WHNc
t
+WFNc
t
)
, (37)
WH
Nsh
t
= ηsh
(
WH
Nsh
t
+WF
Nsh
t
)
, (38)
WL
Nsl
t
= ηsl
(
WL
Nsl
t
+WF
Nsl
t
)
. (39)
where ηi for i = c, sh, sl, represent the workers’ bargaining power.
It is worth making several remarks concerning this bargaining process. First of all, it must be
noticed that wage determination in the presence of on-the-job search can become a complicated
issue because it involves three parties: the earlier employer, the worker and the new employer.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) or Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) deal with this trilateral issue
explicitly. However, in this paper we follow, Hall (2005) and we keep the exposition simple
by assuming that the conventions of the labor market require that a worker who has come in
contact with a prospective new employer while still working for an earlier employer, quit her
existing job before negotiating wages with the new employer. This assumption is no more than
an equilibrium selection rule and it implies that a job found by on-the-job search has the same
present value of wages as one found during a spell of unemployment. This, together with the
assumption that wages in complex jobs are always larger than those in simple jobs8, avoids the
non-convexity problem of the set of feasible payoffs treated in Shimer (2005). Evidently the
wage bargaining process must be interpreted in this context from a macro perspective. From
this point of view we can assume that most wages are determined at the national or sectoral
level through collective bargaining with unions (see section 3.1 for further details on the wage
determination process in Belgium), implying that the outside option taken as reference is the
unemployment benefit.
Second, as underlined latter on in this paper, in the presence of job competition and on-the-job
search this Nash bargaining sharing rule does not necessarily lead to an efficient result, even
8This is essentially an assumption on productivities, firms offering simple vacancies can never bid more than
firms offering complex vacancies.
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when the Hosios-Pissarides condition is satisfied. Finally, remark that the model introduces a
downward rigidity in low-skilled wages via the presence of an outside option (domestic produc-
tivity) that is increasing over time9. This formalization tries to capture the progressive rise
in low-skilled reservation wage over the past decades, which has fostered the observed relative
wage rigidity in European countries. Besides, our representation also avoids wages to absorb
the whole impact in case of shock.
3 Model calibration and simulations
In this section we calibrate the model and use deterministic simulation exercises to illustrate
its properties and gain insights on the effects of various types of shocks. The emphasis will be
on the effects of labor force composition and biased technological change and their interactions
with the “institutional” settings over the period 1976-1996.
3.1 Specification and calibration
The matching function on each job market is represented by the usual Cobb-Douglas specification
with constant returns to scale:
M ct = m
c
(
V ct
)1−λc(
sctU
h
t +sotN
sh
t
)λc
and M st = m
s
(
V st
)1−λs(
shtU
h
t +sltU
l
t
)λs
, (40)
for complex and simple jobs respectively. The Cobb-Douglas specification for the matching
process is quite standard in the literature since it is mathematically simply to deal with and
it seems to provide a good approximation of the real matching process (see Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001)). We follow Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) and use also a constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas function with three inputs to represent the technological constraint faced
by the representative final firm10 (see equations (18) and (19)). The skill-biased change is seen
as the consequence of embodied technological progress and capital-skill complementarity (see
equations (21) and (22)). As in many RBC models, we represent the instantaneous utility
of consumption by the logarithm of consumption expenditures. The leisure cost of on-the-job
search is proportional to the amount of time spent and home productivity is assumed to be
9See Hall (2005) or Hall and Milgrom (2005) for alternative approaches on wage stickiness.
10The choice of a Cobb-Douglas production function is also justified by the available estimations we have for
Belgium concerning the Cobb-Douglas productivity coefficients µθc and µθs (see Sneessens and Shadman (2000)).
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equal to a fraction ψ of aggregate productivity. More formally:
Ut = ln ct , Dt = τ eot and ydt = ψ
yt
Nt
. (41)
Search efficiencies are represented by linear functions of the square root of the time devoted to
search:
sot = φ
o
0 + φ
o
1
√
eot On-the-job search efficiency (42)
sct = φ
c
0 + φ
c
1
√
eht and sht = φ
h
0 + φ
h
1
√
1− eht (43)
High-skilled unemployed search efficiencies
on each labor market segment (44)
slt = φ
l
0 + φ
l
1
√
elt Low-skilled unemployed search efficiency (45)
We follow Pissarides (2000) and assume that recruiting costs are proportional to aggregate
productivity: vct = v
c
0
yt
Nt
and vst = v
s
0
yt
Nt
.
The parameters of the model are whenever possible set to values compatible with the available
empirical evidence. The parameters for which no empirical estimates are available are chosen
so as to reproduce the situation observed in Belgium in the mid nineties (1996). As most EU
countries, the Belgian economy was then neither in a recession nor in a boom. In terms of
employment performance, the Belgian economy is in the EU average and quite representative of
a typical European economy.
The numerical values of the parameters are reported in table 2. The reference period is the
quarter. The elasticity of output with respect to capital coincides with the capital share in total
income; it is set to the standard value 1−µ = 0.33 used in the RBC literature. The depreciation
rate δ is set to 2.5%. We assume that high- and low-skilled workers are equally productive on
simple jobs (ν = 1). This particular choice has little impact on the predictions of the model.
We fix the parameters describing the embodied technical progress so as to reproduce the change
in the relative price of investment goods observed in Belgium during the period 1976-1996 (a
decline rate of around -20% according to data provided by the Belgian Statistical Institute). We
normalize the relative price to unity in 1976 (that is, e0=1 and γ = 0 in 1976) and set the 1996
value of γ to 0.0705 (implying et = 1.23 in 1996). The effects of embodied technical progress
on the relative demand for high- and low-skilled workers are determined by the values of the
16
Symbol Value Symbol Value
Production z 1 µ 0.66
ν 1.00 δ 0.025
e0 1.00 γ 0.071
a0 0.42 a1 10.2
Labor force composition α 0.67
Preferences β 0.99 τ 0.30
Domestic productivity ψ 0.17
Search efficiencies φl0 0.25 φ
l
1 1.00
φh0 0.25 φ
h
1 1.00
φc0 0.25 φ
c
1 0.50
φo0 0.25 φ
o
1 0.50
Matching efficiencies mc 0.38 λc 0.50
ms 0.38 λs 0.50
Bargaining power ηc 0.50
ηsh 0.50 ηsl 0.50
Vacancy costs vc0 0.55 v
s
0 0.10
Job destruction rates χc 0.03 χs 0.05
Average replacement ratio bu 0.34
Table 2: Numerical parameter values (year of reference: 1996).
parameters a0 and a1. These values are chosen so as to reproduce the 1976 and 1996 values of
the Cobb-Douglas coefficients µθc and µθs reported in Sneessens and Shadman (2000).
We define the high-skilled group by an educational attainment level at least equal to a upper-
secondary degree and set α = 0.67, the 1996 value reported by Sneessens and Shadman (2000)
for Belgium. As in most RBC models, consumers’s psychological discount factor β is set to
0.99, implying a steady state real interest rate of 0.01 (real interest rate of 4% per annum).
The domestic productivity parameter ψ is fixed at 0.17 (i.e. the domestic productivity of a
low-skilled worker is equal to 17% of the average aggregate productivity), a value which seems
reasonable and gives a realistic relative wage for the 1996 benchmark simulation (wsl/wc = 62%,
a value close to the relative wage estimated in OECD (1996)).
Our representation of the wage determination process remains of course simplified compared to
the complexity of the Belgian system. In Belgium, there are three levels of wage negotiation:
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the intra-sectoral (national) level, the sectoral level and the individual level. Every two years,
negotiations at the intra-sectoral level determine the legal minimum wage, as well as the “wage
norm”. More regularly, wage negotiations are also held within the different economic sectors
where the legal minimum wage and the wage norm are taken respectively as the lower and upper
bounds: sectoral minimum wages cannot be lower than the legal minimum wage and sectoral
wage increases cannot exceed the limits fixed by the wage norm. Eventually, wages may, at each
period, be (re)negotiated at the individual level. As a consequence, in 1995, only 2% of Belgian
workers were paid at the legal minimum wage while around 10% of them were paid at one of
the minimum wages. In Belgium the estimated gross minimum wage (taking into account the
sectoral minimum wages) represents around 60% of the average wage. We thus fix the net Katz
index (defined as the ratio of the gross minimum wage to the average wage) to 0.58, so that
we obtain for 1996 a minimum wage of 0.70. This value is bigger than the value associated to
domestic activities, meaning that it is always in the interest of a low-skilled worker to accept a
job paid at the minimum wage rather than staying at home. On the other side, we realize that
the average wage earned in simple jobs is around 0.8, and whatever the shocks we introduce, it
never falls below the minimum wage (probably due to the rigidity introduced by the presence
of an indexed domestic productivity).
We have four search efficiency equations, two for each segment of the labor market. Given the
lack of data on these search efficiency parameters, we try to reduce the degrees of freedom in
the calibration process by imposing identical parameter values for a given segment, which leaves
four values to fix. The simple job market search efficiency coefficients have been chosen so as
to normalize low-skilled workers’ search efficiency to unity in 1976 and have a sensitivity to
labor market tightness in the order of magnitude estimated by Patacchini and Zenou (2003)
(around 0.3). The complex market search efficiency coefficients, the disutility parameter τ , the
two matching efficiency parameters and the vacancy cost parameters (vc0 and v
s
0) are given values
to reproduce the 1996 values of the high- and low-skilled unemployment rates (6.8% and 20.1%,
respectively), the probabilities of filling a vacant complex or simple job (qct and q
s
t , around 0.4;
see Delmotte, Hootegem, and Dejonckheere (2001)) and the probabilities of finding a complex
or a simple job (values of pst and p
c
t such that the probability to find a job is around 20% for a
low-skilled worker and 40% for a high-skilled-worker; see Cockx and Dejemeppe (2004)). Our
calibration of vc0 and v
s
0 implies that total vacancy costs represent 3.5% of output in the reference
simulation.
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We follow most authors and set the parameter determining the worker’s share in a match surplus
equal to the coefficient of unemployment in the matching function (see for instance Merz (1995)
and Andolfatto (1996))11. The latter is set at 0.5, a value obtained in many empirical estimates
of the Cobb-Douglas matching function (see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)) and that provides
reasonable results in our simulations. Calibrations for the average replacement ratio (bu = 34%)
and the two job destructions rates (χc = 3% and χs = 5%) are based on estimations by Van der
Linden and Dor (2001) for the Belgian economy.
A result of this calibration exercise is that the proportion of high-skilled workers in simple
jobs equals 7.2%. Even if this result contrasts with the 24% job competition effect found in
Denolf, Denys, and Simoens (2001) for the Belgian economy, we must take into account that
our theoretical setup considers job competition only between two groups of workers: high- and
low-skilled, whereas job competition has been documented to be more intense inside groups.
Our results seem though to be coherent with previous estimations made for Belgium12.
Because the parameters a0 and a1 are chosen so as to reproduce the 1976 and 1996 values
reported in Sneessens and Shadman (2000) of the Cobb-Douglas production function coefficients,
µθc and µθs, and because the parameters for which there is no empirical evidence are chosen to
mimic the situation in Belgium in 1996, it is not surprising to find a benchmark situation close
to the actual data for 1996 (see table 5). Moreover, by assuming that low-skilled workers have
11This choice is typically motivated by the so-called Hosios-Pissarides efficiency condition. It is worth noting
that in our setup with job competition and on-the-job search this condition may not be sufficient to ensure
efficiency.
12Working with data concerning workers entering insured unemployment in Belgium, Cockx and Dejemeppe
(2004) distinguish four labor market segments and find that, in average, 36% of dismissed workers who find a
new job requiring less than upper secondary education are overeducated for the job. The overeducation indicator
used is the share of hirings in jobs requiring less than upper secondary education that are filled by overeducated
workers: Msht /M
s
t , where M
sh
t corresponds to the number of matches between workers having more than upper
secondary education and jobs requiring less than this educational level, and M st stands for the total number of
matches requiring less than upper secondary education. When the ratio M sht /M
s
t is computed for our framework,
where only two labor market segments are distinguished, we find that 29% of hirings in simple jobs are filled by
high-skilled workers. It must be noticed that, contrarily to Cockx and Dejemeppe (2004), we cannot measure
the number of hirings in jobs requiring no education or elementary education that are filled by people with lower
secondary education. By distinguishing only two labor market segments we slightly under-estimate the true job
competition effect, which explains the difference between the 29% crowding-out effect predicted by our model and
the 36% found by Cockx and Dejemeppe (2004).
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the possibility (outside option) to stay at home to do some domestic activities we introduce a
rigidity in low-skilled relative wages, since the value of this domestic production has increased
between 1976 and 1996. The relative rigidity of low-skilled wages together with the adopted
calibration for µθc and µθs, contribute to the good performances of the model in reproducing the
variation of main macroeconomic magnitudes between 1976 and 1996. The numerical exercises
developed in the following sections test the ability of our theoretical framework to capture the
interactions between the economic variables and to reproduce the evolution of unemployment
rates and relative wages observed in Belgium over the past decades.
3.2 Technological shocks, labor force composition and unemployment
We start examining the steady state effects of two different types of shocks in order to test the
properties of the model. In table 3, we consider first a change in the labor force composition
(an increase in the proportion of high-skilled in the total labor force, α) and then, we look to
the effects of an embodied technical shock (variation in γ). A sensitivity analysis on the effects
of a biased technological shock is implemented in table 4. Finally, table 5 displays the historical
simulation of Belgian unemployment rates and relative wages, whereas table 6 quantifies the
contribution of the discouragement effect, the job competition effect and the separate wage
bargaining to the ability of the model to reproduce these historical evolutions of the labor
market. We briefly comment the results13 of each exercise.
Labor force composition
A rise in the proportion of high-skilled workers in the total labor force (α) increases the prob-
ability to fill a complex job, and thus stimulates the opening of complex vacancies. The more
important number of complex jobs improves the marginal productivity of simple jobs, increasing
simple wages and stimulating search effort of low-skilled workers (elt).
On the other side, the higher demand for simple jobs raises the probability of hiring high-skilled
workers on this type of jobs. Their search effort on the simple segment is then stimulated and
job competition increases. All in all, the low-skilled unemployment rate decreases and so does
the high-skilled unemployment rate.
13For the variables expressed in percentage, deviations from the benchmark are absolute deviations; for the
variables expressed in level, deviations from the benchmark are relative deviations.
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Low-skilled High-skilled Low-skilled Aggregate Relative Job
search unemployment unemployment unemployment wage competition
efficiency rate rate rate
Benchmark simulation
corresponding to the year 1996 55.7% 7.0% 21.0% 11.7% 62.1% 7.2%
Proportion of high-skilled
workers: α = 0.67 → α = 0.70 +12.8 -0.4 -3.2 -1.6 +2.7 +2.4
Efficiency of the embodied
technical progress learning
process: γ = 0.71 → γ = 0.74 -8.3 +0.2 +2.9 +1.1 -3.3 -1.3
Table 3: Steady state effects (deviations from the benchmark) of an increase in the proportion
of high-skilled workers and of a biased technological progress.
Biased technological shock
The increase in γ improves the learning efficiency of the embodied technical progress production
process (from each unit of investment the economy is able to obtain more capital than before).
Capital accumulation is then accelerated, which via the capital-skill complementary relationship
stimulates the demand for complex jobs. This, together with the rise in complex wages, results
in an increased search effort of high-skilled unemployed (eht) and employed (eot) on the complex
segment of the labor market.
The larger share of complex jobs in the production function implies a reduction in the share
of simple jobs, leading to a fall in the demand of this type of jobs as well as in their produc-
tivity. Wages decrease and so does the search effort in the simple segment of both low-skilled
unemployed (elt) and high-skilled unemployed (1 − eht). Because both categories of workers
benefit from simple jobs, a downturn in their demand affects both types of unemployment rates.
This, together with the more important proportion of high-skilled workers searching in the com-
plex segment, explains the rise in high-skilled unemployment in spite of the larger demand for
complex jobs.
To sum up, this simulation suggests that skill biased technological progress in a context where
the labor market is characterized by the presence of job competition on the simple segment and
on-the-job search, can foster an increase in high-skilled unemployment rates. Since this result
may seem counterintuitive we proceed to analyze it in more detail.
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High-skilled High-skilled High-skilled Low-skilled Aggregate Relative Job
search search unemployment unemployment unemployment wage competition
efficiency efficiency rate rate rate
complex seg. simple seg.
Benchmark simulation corresponding to the year 1996
1996 74.7% 35.0% 7.0% 21.0% 11.7% 62.1% 7.2%
Search efficiency parameter φc
1
= 0.25
γ = 0.71 → γ = 0.74 -35.3 +72.8 -0.2 +3.5 +1.0 -4.4 +1.9
Search efficiency parameter φh
1
= 1.5
γ = 0.71 → γ = 0.74 +0.1 +4.9 -0.0 +3.6 +1.2 -3.5 -0.5
Search efficiency parameters φc
1
= 0.25, φh
1
= 1.5
γ = 0.71 → γ = 0.74 -36.8 +166.6 -1.3 +4.9 +0.8 -4.9 +4.2
Table 4: Steady state effects (deviations from the benchmark) of a biased technological under
different search efficiency scenarios.
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The assumed calibration concerning the search efficiency parameters of high-skilled workers
(essentially φc1 and φ
h
1) guarantees that increases in the demand for complex jobs (mainly derived
from improvements in the productivity of complex jobs) are accompanied by an upturn in the
search effort (eht) devoted by high-skilled workers to the complex segment. Because the search
effort of high-skilled on the simple segment is computed as a residual of the active time not
spent in looking for a job in the complex segment (1 − eht), an upturn in eht is necessarily
translated into a downturn of the search effort devoted to the simple segment. What happens
if the search efficiency parameter values are modified in such a way that high-skilled workers
become much more efficient when searching in the simple segment than when searching in the
complex segment? In this context, if the worker devotes the same amount of effort to each labor
market segment, search will be more efficient on the simple segment. The trade-off between
spending one unit of time in the complex or in the simple segment, becomes now more favorable
to the simple segment. Therefore, even if job opportunities and wages increase in the complex
segment the worker may not search more intensively for a complex job since the opportunity
cost of each unit of effort devoted to this segment has increased.
In table 4 we develop a sensitivity analysis on the effects of a given biased technological shock
under three different scenarios:
• In the first scenario we assume that the search efficiency parameter on the complex seg-
ment, φc1, falls by 50% with respect to the benchmark situation (φ
c
1 = 0.25). The efficiency
units obtained now from each unit of effort spent on the complex segment represent only
25% of those efficiency units that would have been obtained if the effort had been devoted
to the simple segment. In this new context, even if the biased technical change promotes
the opening of complex vacancies and the rise of complex wages, high-skilled workers pre-
fer to spent more time searching on the simple segment where, thanks to their relatively
more efficient search, they manage to crowd-out low-skilled job seekers (the proportion of
high-skilled workers occupying simple jobs increases in spite of the reduction in the number
of simple vacancies). High-skilled unemployment rate falls.
• In the second scenario, we assume that the search efficiency parameter of high-skilled in
the simple segment increases by 50% to φh1 = 1.5, so that φ
c
1/φ
h
1 = 0.5/1.5 = 0.33. Because
each unit of effort devoted to search in the simple segment is three times more efficient
than if it had been devoted to search in the complex segment, we observe that even if
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employment opportunities and wages in the complex segment are stimulated by the skill
biased technological change, high-skilled workers do not search more intensively in this
segment.
• In the third scenario we combine the two previous scenarios, so that the already described
effects are exacerbated. Even if employment conditions are deteriorated in the simple
segment, high-skilled workers prefer to devote most of their search efforts to this segment,
where they are relatively more efficient. The job competition effect reaches 11.4% and
high-skilled unemployment rates fall.
In sum, for a skill biased technological shock to foster a reduction in high-skilled unemployment
rates the required calibration for the search efficiency parameters must be such that, even when
employment opportunities and wages are higher in the complex segment, high-skilled workers
prefer to devote more effort to the simple segment. This result is completely counterintuitive,
which makes us more confident on the estimations obtained with our initial calibration.
3.2.1 Historical comparison
The first row of table 5 reproduces the observed 1996 values of the proportion of high-skilled
workers in the labor force (α), the share of complex jobs in the production function (µθc), the
net skill-bias14, the high- and low-skilled unemployment rates, the relative wage (wsl/wc) and
an indicator of job competition (N sht /(N
sh
t +N
sl
t )). On the second row we display the change
observed for these variables over the period 1976-1996.
The two last rows of table 5 contain the values obtained from the model. By construction
(calibration) the 1996 values are close to the observed ones. The model performs also well in
reproducing the changes observed during the 1976-1996 period: the increase in unemployment
rates and the stability of relative wages.
Within the theoretical framework developed in this paper the previous results are interpreted as
follows. The post-1975 period in Belgium was characterized by an increase in the proportion of
high-skilled workers in the labor force (from 21.5% to 67%), and by the rise in the decline rate of
the investment good prices with respect to consumption prices (it attained values around -20%
14It is defined as the ratio of the relative productivity coefficient (µθct )/(µθ
s
t ) and the relative labor force
α/(1− α).
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Prop. of Share complex Net High-skilled Low-skilled Relative Job
high-skilled jobs in the Skill unemployment unemployment wage competition
in the production Bias rate rate
labor force function
Actual data
1996 0.67 0.51 1.59 6.8% 20.1% 66% n.a.
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.33 +0.20 +2.1 +13.3 -0.0 n.a.
deviations
Model’s simulation
1996 0.67 0.51 1.77 7.0% 21.0% 62.1% 7.2%
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.25 +2.1 +13.3 -3.4 +5.8
deviations
Table 5: Skill-bias, unemployment rates, relative wages and ladder effect in Belgium: comparing
actual and simulated data.
during the considered period). When introducing in our model both phenomena, we observe
that the acceleration of embodied technological progress15 over the past decades has stimulated
complex jobs creation and simple jobs destruction, via the capital-skill complementary relation-
ship. The increased demand for high-skilled workers in complex jobs has been satisfied by the
large upturn in their supply. In contrast, the fall in the size of the low-skilled labor force has
not been enough to compensate the massive destruction of simple jobs and the increased job
competition. Low-skilled unemployment rises by 13.3 percentage points.
3.2.2 Discouragement effect, separate wage bargaining and job competition
As remarked in section 1, two of the main methodological contributions of this paper, are the
introduction of endogenous search efforts on each labor market segment and a separate wage
bargaining process. The former permits our model to capture the observed discouragement effect
suffered by low-skilled workers over the past years (the decrease in employment opportunities
and wages has led many low-skilled workers to reduce their intensity of search) as well as the
increase in job competition on the simple segment. On the other hand, the presence of an outside
option for low-skilled workers (domestic production) allows the separate wage bargaining process
to reproduce the observed stability in relative wages. Actually, by allowing low-skilled workers to
15The relative price of investment goods is defined as 1/et, therefore an acceleration in the embodied techno-
logical progress results in a decline of this relative price.
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split their active time between searching for a job or staying at home doing domestic activities,
we introduce a source of rigidity on the wage bargaining process, which combined with the
downturn in the demand for simple jobs and job competition has promoted a rise in low-skilled
unemployment rates over the past decades.
Prop. of Share complex Net High-skilled Low-skilled Relative Job
high-skilled jobs in the Skill unemployment unemployment wage competition
in the production Bias rate rate
labor force function
Actual data
1996 0.67 0.51 1.59 6.8% 20.1% 66% n.a.
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.33 +0.20 +2.1 +13.3 -0.0 n.a.
deviations
Simulation without discouragement effect: sl=constant=0.75
1996 0.67 0.52 1.79 6.7% 12.3% 54.4% 6.6%
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.28 +2.5 +4.2 -10.0 +4.8
deviations
Simulation without discouragement effect and indexation of simple wages:
wsl=wsh=0.60 · wc and sl=constant=0.75
1996 0.67 0.52 1.77 7.2% 17.4% 60.0% 6.2%
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.25 +3.7 +12.1 0.0 +4.3
deviations
Simulation without job competition: sh −→ 0
1996 0.67 0.52 1.77 9.3% 16.7% 64.0% 0.0%
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.25 +1.1 +9.2 -3.6 0.0
deviations
Table 6: Skill-bias, unemployment rates, relative wages and ladder effect in Belgium: evaluating
the importance of the discouragement effect and the relative wage rigidity.
The first two rows of the table reproduce the actual values observed for unemployment rates,
relative wages and job competition in 1996, as well as, their variation between 1976 and 1996.
In the third and fourth rows of table 6 we assume a fixed search efficiency for low-skilled workers
(no discouragement effect since elt is not longer a decision variable), while we leave high-skilled
search efficiencies on each market segment variable16. We keep the separate wage bargaining
for each type of worker. The flexibility of wages17 together with the constant search efficiency
16The discouragement only affects low-skilled workers.
17In this new framework the effect of domestic production as a source of wage rigidity is smoothed due to the
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of low-skilled workers (who are not longer discouraged), fosters a reduction in unemployment
levels and in its observed variation. Ignoring the rigidity of relative wages observed in Europe
over the last 25 years as well as the discouragement effect of low-skilled workers, prevents thus
the model from reproducing the evolution of unemployment rates.
The fifth and sixth rows of table 6, neglect the discouragement effect of low-skilled workers
but introduce an indexation of wages in simple jobs (wsht and w
sl
t represent 60% of w
c
t ), so as
to eliminate the flexibility we had in the third and fourth rows of the table. These structural
modifications lead to a reduction in the estimated low-skilled unemployment rates for 1996 with
respect to actual data (the unemployment rate equals 17.4% instead of 20.1%). Even if the ability
of the model to reproduce unemployment rates in 1996 is deteriorated, its predicting performance
concerning the variation of unemployment between 1976 and 1996 is not strongly damaged: the
model predicts an increase in high- and low-skilled unemployment rates of +3.7 and +12.1
percentage points while the actual variation is +2.1 and +13.3 points, respectively. These
estimations suggest that, while incorporating the discouragement effect improves the ability
of the model to mimic unemployment levels for 1996, the observed unemployment variation
between 1976 and 1996 mainly responds to the rigidity in relative wages.
The last two rows of the table summarize the labor market evolutions that would have been
observed if the search efficiency of high-skilled workers on the simple segment converged to
zero. In this context, low-skilled unemployment rates would have been reduced by more of 3
percentage points in 1996 with respect to actual data (while high-skilled unemployment raises).
Moreover, in the absence of job competition the model predicts a variation of 9 percentage points
in low-skilled unemployment rates, instead of the 12 points observed in actual data. Crowding-
out of low-skilled workers by high-skilled plays therefore a relevant role in explaining low-skilled
unemployment levels and their variation.
To sum up, endogeneizing the search effort of low-skilled workers, and giving them the choice
between looking for a job or doing domestic production, introduces a rigidity in the wage bar-
gaining process18 that allows our model to reproduce the evolution of unemployment rates and
relative wages between 1976 and 1996. As soon as the search effort is taken as constant, rel-
ative wages become more flexible and the model predicts a smaller change in unemployment
constancy of the low skilled workers’ search effort.
18Remark that domestic productivity is assumed to be proportional to aggregate productivity, therefore its
value increases over time.
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and a larger one in relative wages. If we combine this fixed search effort with an indexation of
low-skilled wages to high-skilled ones, the model recovers its ability to reproduce unemployment
variation between 1976 and 1996, while loosing its predicting ability for the 1996’s levels. Fi-
nally, we conclude that the crowding-out of low-skilled workers by high-skilled ones accounts for
more than 3 percentage points of the 1996 low-skilled unemployment rate.
3.3 Policy scenarios
The persistence of high unemployment rates during the eighties and the nineties, has led the
literature to focus on the role of labor market institutions rather than in economic shocks as
it was the case during the seventies. Nowadays most of the discussions concerning European
unemployment rates focus on the rigidity introduced by labor market institutions whereas the
effect of shocks is completely ignored. However, as remarked by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000),
while adverse shocks may explain a general increase in unemployment rates, different institutions
explain differences in outcomes across countries.
In section 3.2.1 we test the ability of the model to reproduce the variation in unemployment
rates and relative wages when a change (a shock) in the proportion of high-skilled workers and
in the relative price of new investment goods is introduced. In this section we try to combine
both, the effects of shocks and labor market institutions. We consider two policy instruments:
the replacement ratio and wage subsidies. As the empirical and theoretical literature has largely
documented, the presence of a generous unemployment insurance leads to an increase in equilib-
rium unemployment rates due to a reduced search intensity and its effect on the bargained wage.
On the other hand, the so called “tax wedge” while not directly affecting the unemployment
rate has a direct effect on wages.
We use the utility level of high-skilled workers Uh = ln(Cht /α)−N sht D (eot) /α as an indicator of
the high-skilled welfare level. In the same way, the utility level of low-skilled, U l = ln(C lt/(1−α)),
proxies the welfare level of this type of workers. Because the utility functions are assumed to be
welfare indicators, the attention must be focused on the variation of the value function (rather
than on the specific value of the utility function). We will compare the final welfare attained by
each type of worker under every policy context with respect to the welfare she obtained in the
benchmark simulation corresponding to 1996.
Table 7 considers different policy scenarios and compares them to the benchmark simulation
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implemented in section 3.2.1. Comparisons are implemented in a static framework, that is, we
compare the final steady states associated to each situation without considering the transitional
dynamics.
• We start analyzing a policy measure giving to firms a proportional subsidy of 20% of low-
skilled wages in 1996, this measure being financed through a tax on high-skilled wages. This
target policy turns out to be beneficial for both, high and low-skilled workers, in terms
of unemployment reductions (this is consistent with the findings of Pierrard (2004) for
the Belgian economy). Indeed, the subsidy increases the marginal value the firm obtains
from low-skilled workers, which stimulates the opening of simple vacancies and, thus,
search efforts in the simple segment. High-skilled unemployment rates slightly fall whereas
low-skilled unemployment decreases considerably. In welfare terms, the comparison with
respect to the reference simulation, reveals that this measure mainly favors low-skilled
workers, whose welfare level clearly raises.
Prop. of Share of Net High-sk. Low-sk. Relative Job High-sk. Low-sk.
high-skilled complex jobs Skill unempl. unempl. wage competition welfare welfare
in the in production Bias rate rate indicator indicator
labor force function
Reference Simulation
1996 0.67 0.51 1.77 7.0% 21.0% 62.1% 7.2% 0.34 -0.20
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.25 +2.1 +13.3 -3.4 +5.8 -0.25 -0.08
deviations
Proportional subsidy to low wages of 20% in 1996
1996 0.67 0.52 1.80 6.8% 13.0% 71.8% 7.2% 0.33 -0.09
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.29 +2.0 +5.2 +6.3 +5.7 -0.25 +0.02
deviations
Replacement ratio of 17% in 1996
1996 0.67 0.52 1.82 5.7% 12.1% 54.3% 7.0% 0.43 -0.33
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.31 +0.9 +4.3 -11.2 +5.5 -0.16 -0.20
deviations
Replacement ratio of 17% and a subsidy to low-skilled wages of 20% in 1996
1996 0.67 0.52 1.83 5.5% 8.6% 66.6% 7.8% 0.40 -0.17
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.32 +0.6 +0.9 +1.1 +6.4 -0.19 -0.05
deviations
Table 7: Comparing the reference simulation with different policy scenarios.
• Next we assume a situation where the replacement ratio is set to 17% (the half of its
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actual value) in 1996. This measure mainly affects low-skilled workers, whose consumption
is constrained by their revenue. Reducing the replacement ratio implies a reduction in
the reservation wage. This stimulates employment since firms can now offer lower wages
and low-skilled workers search more intensively for a job. Both unemployment rates fall,
however, only high-skilled welfare is improved, since low-skilled workers suffer from an
important loss in their revenue that results in a downturn of their consumption level.
• We then combine the two previous policy measures. This policy mix leads to a Pareto
improving situation where the unemployment rates of both types of households are lower
and their welfare is improved with respect to the reference simulation. The reduced re-
placement ratio stimulates employment, leading to a decrease in unemployment rates. At
the same time, the subsidy to low-skilled wages avoids the loss in the welfare suffered by
unskilled workers due to the downturn in their revenue.
To sum up, if the increase in the proportion of high-skilled workers and the decrease in the
relative price of new investment goods, i.e. two shocks observed over the past decades, had been
associated to less rigid labor market institutions (eg.: less generous unemployment insurance)
we would have observed a smaller increase in unemployment rates. Moreover, table 7 suggests
that an appropriate policy mix could have led to this result without implying any lost in welfare.
Of course, policies based on subsidies to low-skilled wages are, at best, effective in the short and
medium term (see Pierrard (2004)). However, in the long-run, an increase in the proportion of
skilled in the total labor force seems more appropriate. More precisely, as suggested in various
studies (see for example Cockx and Dejemeppe (2004)) a human capital investment policy19
would mitigate skill mismatch and job competition and it would stimulate the appearance of
technological sites that develop productive activities.
4 Conclusions
Over the last 30 years, European average unemployment rates and, especially, low-skilled un-
employment rates have followed an increasing trend. Two reasons are traditionally put forward
to explain this rise: (i) the adoption of new technologies being more demanding in skilled la-
bor, combined with a rigidity in relative wages over the time, has resulted in the appearance of
19According to CESRW (2001) only 3.7% of Belgian unemployed workers had participated in a training pro-
gramme in 2000.
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skill mismatch effects; (ii) aggregate technological shocks implying a decrease in the total labor
demand have crowded out lower educated workers by higher educated ones (job competition).
Models built up to now were unable to capture simultaneously the stylized facts observed in
most European economies: the rise in the overall unemployment rate, the more important
increase in low-skilled unemployment rates and the stability of relative wages. Our paper focuses
on these issues. We build an intertemporal general equilibrium model based on Pierrard and
Sneessens (2002) but incorporating separate wage bargaining for all workers, endogenous search
efficiencies on each labor market segment and endogenous skill-biased technological progress. We
calibrate it on the basis of Belgian data and test its ability to reproduce both the situation in
Belgium in 1996 and the observed variation in economic magnitudes between 1976 and 1996. Our
theoretical setup performs well in both cases. Evidently a non negligible part of the predicting
ability of the model is due to the effect of embodied technological progress on the Cobb-Douglas
productivity coefficients. We also find that relative wage stability and job competition have a key
role in explaining the variation (rise) in low-skilled unemployment rates over the past decades,
while the effect of low-skilled discouragement mainly affects unemployment levels rather than
unemployment variations.
Our model constitutes a successful attempt to take simultaneously into account the stylized facts
characterizing most European countries over the last decades. However there are several limiting
assumptions that we need to analyze in detail in order to improve our understanding of these
phenomena. First of all, this paper assumes an exogenous evolution of the proportion of high-
skilled in the labor force, α. Evidently, an interesting extension would consist in endogeneizing
the evolution of α. In this new context, an acceleration of embodied technological progress should
stimulate workers to educate themselves and α would increase endogenously between 1976 and
1996. Second, our paper ignores the effect of growth. To have a more complete representation
of the economy and to improve the comprehension of the stylized facts that have characterized
its evolution, we should extend the model to an endogenous growth context. Finally, it might
be interesting to check whether results are robust to a change in the functional form of the
production function. This approach is however limited by the fact that, for Belgium, we only
have estimations for the Cobb-Douglas productivity coefficients. To adopt a different functional
form, we would have to use the estimations provided in the literature for other countries (in
Krusell et al. (2000) the authors use U.S. data to estimate the productivity coefficients of a
nested CES production function).
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